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Abstract This paper examines the generation of resource rent during the
transition from an over-exploited to an efficiently managed fishery. A simple
theoretical model is used to demonstrate that current industry returns may be
low or even negative during this adjustment phase.
A case in point is the New Zealand commercial fisheries which have re-
cently become subject to a Quota Management System. Three sources of
evidence on the level of resource rents generated during the initial years of the
Quota Management System are examined and compared. These sources are:
annual profitability data; the market price of perpetual quota; and the market
price of annual lease quota. The evidence in some cases appears to be con-
tradictory and an attempt is made to resolve or explain such differences. It is
concluded that a better understanding of price determination in the quota
market is reqtured in order to draw correct inferences about rent generation.
Keywords Rent, Generation, Transition, Individual, Transferable, Quotas,
Fishery, Management, New Zealand.
Introduction
This paper examines the generation of resource rent' during the transition from an
over-exploited to an efficiently managed fishery. If fishery managers want to
The authors are grateful to Lee Anderson and to an anonymous referee for detailed and
constructive suggestions about the revision of earlier drafts.
* Gary Bevin was Chief Economist, New Zealand Fishing Industry Board when this paper
was first prepared.
' We follow Anderson (1988), who defmes resource or "management" rent as "the differ-
ence between the market price of a unit of catch and the harvesting cost to the marginal
producer". We interpret the harvesting cost to the marginal producer to be his long-run
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collect resource rent generated in the fishery during this period, it is important
that they understand the implications of the fact that it takes time for the fishery
to adjust to its new efficient equilibrium. During this adjustment phase current
industry returns may be low or even negative, and the imposition of resource
rentals may require firms to borrow against expected future returns. Even if
capital markets were perfect, this would be an inefficient way of raising public
revenue because industry borrowing costs are usually higher than those of gov-
ernment. Moreover, given the apparent inability of governments around the world
to solve these capital market imperfections, the capacity of industry to pay re-
source rentals may be constrained by current resource rents.
A case in point is the New Zealand commercial fisheries which have recently
become subject to a Quota Management System which is designed to generate
resource or management rent. A possible policy goal is that the government
should attempt to collect some of the resource rent generated by the fishery under
efficient management. For example, in New Zealand the government has intro-
duced a resource rental which is a specific royalty payable by the holder of the
right to harvest the fish. The appropriate level of the resource rental depends upon
the amount of rent which is generated. This raises the question of how that rent
can be measured over time.
In the second section of the paper a simple model of resource rent generation
in a fishery is outlined as a starting point for the analysis. That model is compared
with the circumstances surrounding the development of the management regime
for the New Zealand commercial fisheries in the third section in order to highlight
differences between the simple model and the actual situation of those fisheries.
In the fourth section various sources of evidence on the level of resource rents in
the initial years of the Quota Management System are examined and compared.
The evidence in some cases appears to be contradictory, and an attempt is made
to resolve or explain the differences observed. It is essential to be able to do this
if managers are to be able to set royalties which are consistent with the industry's
current ability to pay. The final section summarizes the discussion.
I I
The Basic Model of Rent Generation
In this basic model it is assumed that the fishery is originally in open access
equilibrium and exploited by a large number of identical vessels or firms. When a
quota management system is introduced each vessel is allocated a quota which is
less than its harvest in the initial equilibrium. The sum of the quotas issued is
assumed to be the optimal harvest h* corresponding to the optimal level of effort
E*. In this analysis the optimal level of effort is assumed to be that which,
consistent with a zero rate of interest, maximizes the flow of rent from the fishery.
Furthermore the adjustment path from an over-exploited to a managed fishery is
marginal and average total cosl in long-run equilibrium. An alternative approach would be
to define resource rent earned during a defined time period as the change during that time
period in the NPV of all future returns from exploitation of the fishery. Such a definition
is consistent with the theoretically impeccable capital theory approach developed, inter
alia, by Clark (1976). From a practical point of view, we believe that such a definition is not
operational in a world of imperfect foresight. More importantly, it does not provide a
reasonable basis for assessing year to year changes to industry's capacity to pay for access
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imposed rather than derived as part of the optimization. Figure 1 reproduces a
diagram which is widely used to analyze the generation of rent in a managed
fishery (see, for example, Anderson (1986, 1988)).
Figure l(a) illustrates the short-run average total cost and average fixed costs
of a typical firm in long-run equilibrium. The minimum point of the short-run
average cost curve is the minimum long-run average cost denoted by C. Figure
l(b) shows the relationship between the value of the average product of fishing
effort (VAPE) and total fishing effort defined as the number of vessels times the
amount of effort contributed by each vessel. The value of the average product of
effort is the price offish, assumed constant in this model, times the catch per unit
effort. The VMPE curve represents the value of the marginal product of effort,
measured as the price of fish times the marginal physical product of effort.
In the open access fishery, effort enters the fishery in response to perceived
opportunities for earning economic rent. This drives down the average product of
effort until all rent has been dissipated. The open access equilibrium is at E^ where
the value of the average product just equals the long-run opportunity cost of
effort. By contrast, in afishery managed so as to maximize the flow of rent, effort
will be set at level E* so that the value of the marginal product of effort just equals
its opportunity cost.
In Figure 1 comparative static analysis is used to compare the initial pre-
management open access equilibrium with the new equilibrium once management
is established. No analysis of the process whereby the system moves from the
initial to the new equilibrium is attempted. The reason for emphasizing the latter
point is that the move from E^ to E* involves significant changes in the biology
and economics of the fishery which take time to occur. This means that analysis
based on Figure 1 can be misleading if it is used to make predictions about the






Figure 1. Firm and Industry Equilibrium in a Managed and Unmanaged Fishery.232 Lindner. Campbell, and Bevin
The reduction in effort from E^, to E* has two effects which take time to
realize: one is a re-al!ocation to more productive uses elsewhere in the economy;
and the other is an increase in the size of the fish stock and consequent produc-
tivity of the effort which continues to be devoted to the fishery. In the long-run a
resource rent or fishery management rent is predicted to emerge as a result of
these changes. It can be measured in a number of ways in Figure I.
The simplest measure is the area FDBC which is the value of the average
product of effort less the opportunity cost per unit of effort, and multiplied by the
optimal level of effort. It is also measured by area ABC which is the value of total
harvest less total catching costs. A third, and less obvious measure is area BGH,
and it is worth examining in detail why this is so. In the initial open access
equilibrium there is no economic rent generated by the fishery. This means that
the value of total output, measured by area AHE^,0 is equal to total cost, measured
by CGEoO. It follows from this that area BGH must equal ABC which is a measure
of resource rent. Thus areas EDBC, ABC, and BGH are equal to one another and
equal to the flow of resource rent per period.
An intuitive explanation of why the resource rent can be measured by area
BGH lies in the re-allocation of effect to more productive uses elsewhere. The
long-run effect of management is to exclude E^E* units of effort from the fishery.
In the long-run this amount of effort can produce goods valued at BGE^E* else-
where in the competitive economy. Another effect of excluding this amount of
effort from the fishery, however, is to reduce the value of harvest by BHEQE*.
The net gain is BGH which is a measure of resource rent.
It can be seen from the above analysis that the generation of fishery rent
depends both upon the re-allocation of effect to other areas of the economy and on
the recovery of the fish stock leading to higher catch rates per unit of effort. While
these two effects can be expected to occur in the long-run, they will only partially
occur in the short-run because the production of fishing effort involves the use of
industry specific capital which has no productive use elsewhere in the economy,
and because the fish stock will take time to grow. The discussion below considers
the generation of resource rent against the background of a growing fish stock
giving steadily increasing catch per unit of effort. Two Cases are considered to
illustrate the importance of the assumptions made about fixed costs. In Case I all
costs are assumed to be variable costs; and in Case 2 a mix of fixed and variable
costs is considered.
Case 1: All Costs Variable
In this case, when the QMS imposes a TAC less than the initial harvest, effort
which is surplus to the taking of this lower harvest at the existing rate of catch per
unit effort leaves the fishery with no net loss to the economy. The effort remaining
in the fishery, E > B*, initially has a VAPE = C. As fish stocks recover and catch
per unit effort rises the amount of effort needed to take the TAC declines further
until it reaches the new long-run equilibrium at E*. This further amount of effort
shed by the fishery is employed elsewhere at its opportunity cost. As catch per
unit effort rises VAPE rises above C and the fishery starts to generate positive
rents.
In summary, as far as costs are concerned. Case 1 is identical to the long-run
case illustrated in Figure I. The only adjustment which takes time is the recoveryRent Generation During Transition to an ITQ System 233
of the fish stock. Because that does not occur instantaneously it takes time for
rents to be generated by the QMS.
At this point it will be helpful to consider the price of annual lease quota
immediately after the introduction of the QMS. Since the fish stock has not had
time to grow, the catch per unit effort remains equal to the opportunity cost per
unit effort. Consequently, enough effort will leave the fishery to ensure that
fishing effort continues to earn its opportunity cost because effort is perfectly
mobile in this case. The difference between the average return and the opportu-
nity cost of effort measures the resource rent which is initially zero. This is
reflected in a zero market price of annual lease quota. The price of perpetual quota
may be positive refiecting anticipated rises in the average return per unit of effort,
and the price of annual lease quota will rise over time as these changes occur.
Case 2: Some Costs Fixed, Some Variable
In Figure l(a) average fixed cost of producing effort is given by K. Following the
introduction of a total catch quota of h* (allocated by ITQ's), effort is reduced to
a level in excess of E*, but below E^, because of the low productivity of the
fishery. The value of the catch will be reduced to FDE*O in Figure l(b). This area
is less than the value of the catch under open access because h* < h^,. Because of
fixed costs, the reduction in value of harvest will be only partially offset by an
increase in output elsewhere in the economy measured by an area less than
BGML. The net loss to the economy in the short-run is at least as large as the area
LMEQE*, and this loss will be refiected in a downward revision of capita! asset
prices in the fishing industry. Implicit in this analysis is the assumption of constant
returns to fishing effort in the short-run. If the law of diminishing marginal pro-
ductivity applies to fishing effort when the size of the fish stock is held constant,
then it is possible for resource rents to be positive even during this adjustment
period.^
In the long-run, as the productivity of the fish stock rises, the required amount
of effort will decline to E*. Additional variable inputs will be shifted to other uses
and fixed assets will be written off. The decline in value of harvest, as compared
with the open-access equilibrium, will be increasingly offset, and eventually out-
weighed, by increases in output elsewhere in the economy. The pattern of rent
generation matches the investment process: an initial period of negative returns is
followed by positive rents as the productivity of the fish stock rises and as output
rises in other sectors of the economy.
In Case 2, in contrast to Case 1, the price of annual lease quota immediately
after the introduction of the QMS will be positive because of the inability of
excess fixed assets to exit from the fishery in the short-run to productive uses
elsewhere.^ The positive price of annual lease quota represents a quasi-rent
^ We are indebted to Lee Anderson for pointing out this possibility to us.
^ The market price of fixed assets, such as fishing boats, which are made redundant
through the introduction of ITQ's will fall below depreciated replacement cost. This fall in
asset value is a real social cost measuring the extent of overinvestment in fishing capacity
given introduction of a QMS. It also is a real cost to the industry, albeit one which ought
to he offset eventually against positive returns once the fish stock has increased in size and
investment in catching capacity has been rationalised. The appropriate time to recognise234 Lindner, Campbell, and Bevin
earned by the quota asset which, other things remaining equal, will disappear in
the long-run as capital exits from the industry. It will be replaced by a resource
rent the value of which depends upon the difference between the average return
per unit of effort and the long-run average cost of effort at the new equilibrium.
That the quasi-rent is merely a transfer from the owners of physical assets to the
owners of quota is demonstrated by Figure l(b): area BGH represents the re-
source rent which only accrues once excess fishing effort has found a productive
use elsewhere in the economy. It should be emphasized that this analysis dem-
onstrates that the price of quota in a perfectly competitive market is not a measure
of resource rent if that market is in disequilibrium.
In the model described above, which imphcitly assumes a zero rate of interest,
the total value over some finite time horizon, of the flow of rents generated by the
management programme is positive. In the textbook model, quota In the fishery
issued in perpetuity would be expected to command a positive price. In a com-
petitive market, this price would be equal to the net present value of the flow of
expected rent per unit of quota, assuming risk neutrality. One of the advantages
claimed for a tradeable ITQ system is that fishery managers can obtain informa-
tion about the performance of the system from the quota market.'' However, as
indicated by Case 2, current industry losses are not inconsistent with positive
perpetual quota prices or, as argued in the fourth section, with positive annual
lease quota prices. Alternatively, information about rent generation can be ob-
tained from traditional sources such as the profit and loss accounts and balance
sheets of the firms involved. While the basic model provides a useful context in
which to interpret data from these sources, interpretation of data from the quota
trading market is not as straightforward as might be suggested by a simple com-
parative static model for reasons to be discussed below. However, before the data
for the New Zealand ITQ system are examined, it is necessary to consider certain
respects in which the circumstances of the New Zealand fisheries may vary from
those represented by the model.
The New Zealand Quota Management System
The Quota Management System (QMS) is described in detail by Clark and Major
(1988) and Clark (1989), as well as being analysed in some detail by Anderson
(1988). The system was first developed in 1983 for a limited number of deep-water
fish stocks, and then extended in 1986 to almost all remaining significant fish
stocks. For most species the TAC was set at a level below current harvest levels,
the primary exceptions being some of the deep-water stocks. Most ITQ's were
allocated to firms in proportion to past harvests, although some quota was sold to
industry by tender. In some fisheries the TAC was reduced by government buying
back some of the allocated quota.
There are several respects in which the introduction of the QMS does not fit
precisely the textbook model described in the previous section of the paper. In the
first place, the QMS applies to a number offish stocks which varied in terms of
the extent and form of previous management, and the intensity of exploitation
these losses is arguable, but in this paper they have effectively been amortised over the
working life of the fixed assets by depreciating fixed assets on a replacement cost basis.
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prior to the QMS. Not all stocks were in open access equilibrium as depicted by
EQ, and not all stocks were subject to the same relative reduction in TAC. In fact,
in the case of some previously under-exploited fisheries, additional TAC over
current harvest levels was allocated by tender. Secondly, while the TACs estab-
lished by the QMS were set with a view to generating resource rent, it is not
possible on the basis of the information available to ascertain how close they are
to the h* depicted in the textbook model.
A third qualification concerning the applicability of the model relates to the
issue of excess capacity. There is evidence of excess capacity following the in-
troduction of the QMS. The Fishing Industry Board conducted a survey of ca-
pacity utilization in August 1988. Each of the respondents indicated excess ca-
pacity in the order of 25-30 per cent. Anecdotal evidence about depressed prices
for boats and fishing gear is consistent with the survey results. On the other hand,
at least part of the fishery is exploited by foreign vessels on charter, and it would
be expected that these could more readily be switched to other uses.
Clearly the model of the introduction of fishery management described in the
second section fits some of New Zealand's fisheries more closely than others.
Hence the extent to which current resource rents generated in the initial period of
management are negative is an empirical question. Managers seeking to monitor
the performance of the QMS in generating resource rent will need to consult
various data relating to revenues and costs. Since the industry is largely organized
on a multi-species basis with most firms fishing a variety of stocks it is not
possible to conduct this kind of analysis on a stock by stock basis even when
trading prices of quota on individual species can be observed. The aim of the
empirical analysis, therefore, is to provide some evidence on whether, on balance,
the New Zealand commercial fisheries are currently earning positive returns, or
whether they are still on the adjustment phase of negative returns predicted by the
model. The answer to this question has important implications for a public policy
of collecting a proportion of current returns by means of a royalty.
Estimating Current Returns to the Fish Resource
In the second section of the paper it was concluded that implementation of a QMS
might initially impose costs rather than yield benefits. The three sources of evi-
dence that are available in New Zealand to estimate resource rents are now
examined: industry profitability data, prices paid for perpetual quota, and prices
paid for annual lease of quota.
Industry Profitability Data
An estimate of the size of the current resource rent for the 1987/88 fishing year can
be derived from data provided by two recent studies. Each year the New Zealand
Department of Statistics carries out a profitability survey of firms in the fishing
industry as part of its Annual Enterprise Survey (AES). In 1988, industry and the
government also jointly commissioned an independent study to estimate the re-
quired rate of return on assets for the fishing industry.
While the AES provides comprehensive coverage of all sectors of the New
Zealand fishing industry, and is expertly collected and collated by independent
professionals, it was not designed nor intended to answer the type of questions
posed here. Hence the raw data from the AES have to be adjusted in various ways236 Lindner, Campbell, and Bevin
in order to derive an estimate of the current level of resource rent derived from
catching fish in New Zealand. A detailed description of the adjustments made is
provided in Lindner and Campbell (1989)^ and only the main aspects are sum-
marised here.
Firms surveyed in the Annual Enterprise Survey used a variety of different
year end balance dates ranging from March 1988 to November 1988. Hence simply
summing financial flows and capital values across all firms can provide a distorted
picture of the results if one or more of the key determinants of profitability altered
appreciably during the 1987/88 fishing season. There is no easy and completely
satisfactory solution to this problem, but at least it was possible to correct for
significant price movements by use of price indices to "roll forward" accounting
data to a common balance date. Details of the procedure used to adjust these data
so as to apply to the 1987/88 fishing year ending 30 September 1988 are explained
in Lindner and Campbell (1989).
Adjustment also had to be made to the treatment of capital costs used by the
Department of Statistics to calculate profit from AES data, because the estimate
of resource rent should be based on economic profit rather than accounting profit.
In particular, the opportunity cost of capital calculated by applying an estimate of
the required return on capital to the entire capital base was substituted for actual
interest payments made.
Of the four measures of asset value enumerated in the Annual Enterprise
Survey, historical book value under-estimates true value because it does not allow
for inflation subsequent to acquisition of the asset. Conversely, gross replacement
cost over-estimates true value because no allowance is made for physical depre-
ciation. Arguments could be mounted in support of either subjectively estimated
market value or indemnity value, but as there turned out to be little difference
between them, indemnity value was used in this paper as the more objective
measure.^ The required real rate of return on fishing industry assets as at March
1988 was estimated to be 9 per cent after tax.^
The treatment of depreciation also was modified to correct for distortions
arising from typical accounting practices such as under-valuing assets at historical
cost, and for biasing up depreciation rates used in books of account because of
taxation considerations. To calculate real depreciation, an assumption needs to be
made about the working life of the assets. Industry sources advised that a rea-
sonable life expectation for well maintained modern fishing vessels would be 30
years. This assumption translates into a "declining balance" depreciation rate of
about 5 per cent, so that rate was applied to the indemnity value of physical assets
to arrive at an estimate of real depreciation.
Certain firm expenses such as resource rental payments to government are
merely transfer payments from a broader social perspective, and need to be ex-
cluded when estimating resource rents. For similar reasons, all "profits" (or
losses) associated with trading in, or leasing of ITQ's, as well as dividend pay-
' Available on request from the authors.
* Because there are financial penalties lo the firm from under or over-insurance.
' Based on a "risk free" rate of 5 percent, a company tax rate of 28 per cent, an estimated
market risk premium of 8 per cent and an estimated beta value of 0.7, the required real rate
of return is 8.97%, and the corresponding nominal rate is 16.7% after tax. Lindner and
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ments to shareholders, were netted out from revenues and expenses. Likewise,
the value of assets used to calculate the opportunity cost of capital were exclusive
of all quota holdings, and of possible cross share-holdings between member com-
panies of the same corporate group.
Interpretation of these data is further complicated by the fact that some 15
large vertically-integrated firms own about 90 per cent of all quota, while the
remainder of the quota is held by about 500 small fishing operations who, almost
without exception, do not process their catch in any significant way. Because
there are different types of problems associated with each of these two industry
sectors, they are treated separately.
Data for the so-called Major Quota Holders (MQH) are based on audited
accounting records of company activities, which include but are not necessarily
limited to fishing. Within the limitations of the data supplied to it, the Department
of Statistics attempts to the best of its ability to separate profitability estimates for
each of these activities, but the need to make various subjective assumptions
inevitably influences these estimates. For example, most of the major quota hold-
ers both catch and process fish, so there are no "arm's length" market transac-
tions which can be used to value fish caught and processed by the same firm.
Some firms put their own value on these fish transfers which are based on ruling
market prices, but for other firms it was necessary to make some assumption
about the port price that would have been received on a "wetfish" basis in order
to separate combined revenue into components attributable to the catching oper-
ation, and to processing. On the basis of information from industry sources,
realised port prices in markets for "wetfish" during this period averaged about 15
per cent above catching costs, so this markup was assumed for those firms that
did not value the catch separately.
Aggregate industry revenues, expenses, and asset values derived from the
Annual Enterprise Survey using the procedures outlined above are set out in
Table 1.
Estimated resource rents for major quota holders in 1987/88 was -NZ$22 mil-
lion, and close to zero for non-major quota holders. Given the relative magnitude
of quota holdings by these two sectors, the two estimates are broadly consistent,
and indicate that resource rent for the industry in toto was at best zero, and may
well have been negative and in excess of NZ$20 million.
It is possible that even this large loss might understate the true economic
return for 1987/88, because conventional accounting procedures commonly un-
derestimate the marginal value product of some inputs. For instance, owner/
operators of fishing firms often have highly developed catching skills which are
not fully recompensed by their salary payments. Anderson (1988) dubs these
unrewarded expenses "high-liner rents". In addition, note that any super-normal
profits earned from fish processing or other related activities might also be incor-
porated into the accounting data collected in the AES. By the same token, there
are obvious incentives for firms to minimise accounting profit, and it is quite
possible that the figures in Table 1 over-estimate the magnitude of the losses
incurred by the fishing industry in 1987/88. Although no obvious sources of distor-
tion were discovered by the authors in a critical review of the AES data, the ag-
gregated nature of the data preclude detection of possible understatement of prof-
its by some firms. On balance, the AES survey data suggests that the industry sus-
tained an economic loss which may have been substantial in the 1987/88 fishing year.238 Lindner, Campbell, and Bevin
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Prices Paid for Perpetual Quota '
Some idea of the characteristics of the market for quota can be gained from Table
2 in which trades of ITQ of selected fish stocks are summarized. For each species,
this Table contains the average price paid for perpetual quota, the median price,
and the highest and lowest decile price in the 1986/87 and 1987/88 seasons. Ag-
gregate quota value for the fishery as a whole can be estimated by multiplying
median price by the respective TAC for each species, and then summing across
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lower bound estimates of aggregate value. The estimated capitalized value of the
fishery derived from 1986/87 data was NZ$550 million while the 1987/88 data
suggest a value of NZ$765 million.
The data reported in Table 2 are most unlikely to provide fishing managers
with an indication of the current size of resource rent for a variety of reasons.
First, some reservations about their reliability should be noted. According to
industry sources, statistics on trading prices for ITQ cannot be taken at face value
because the prices recorded on the registration forms are often fictitious. Some
trades take place at purely nominal prices between different legal entities which
are under common managerial control. Other trades are really barter transactions
with no money changing hands, and an arbitrarily chosen price is registered sim-
ply to satisfy the recording requirements of the QMS. Preliminary analysis of
quota trading data has revealed numerous anomalies which support this point of
view.
Secondly, the trading price of ITQ in perpetuity will be determined by the
capitalised value of the expected stream of annual willingness to pay for quota.
There are several reasons why annual fishery management rent might be expected
to grow over time, so it is conceivable that positive prices will be paid for ITQ held
in perpetuity even when the current level of rent is negative. Two principal rea-
sons for expecting resource rent to increase over time are technical change leading
to a decline in costs, and increases in the relative price offish.
Once the ITQ system becomes effective, rents generated by technological
change should not be dissipated by over-fishing. Hence firms will have a greater
incentive to invest in new technology, which in turn improves the productivity of
catching activities. Agriculture is probably the industry which provides the best
indication of the empirical magnitude of this effect. Results from studies of the
rate of return on capital investment in agriculture consistently show very low rates
of return {i.e. typically around 3 per cent per annum on total invested capital,
including the value of land). The other way of viewing this evidence is that land
prices are over-capitalised relative to the current returns earned from farming.
Two explanations for this low rate of return are often put forward. One is that
farmers value farming as a way of life and are prepared to accept lower returns in
order to continue to enjoy the lifestyle. There is an obvious correspondence here
to the situation for small, owner/operator fishermen. The other reason for the
depressed returns in agriculture is that productivity keeps improving as a result of
research and development, so that farmers expect the returns of farming to keep
rising over time. It seems reasonable to assume that a similar situation will hence-
forth exist in the New Zealand fishing industry, with capitalised prices for ITQ's
playing a similar role to capitalised land prices in agricuUure.
However, there are grounds for believing that the real price of fish might
increase over time. One is that the supply offish from the ocean is highly inelastic
because there is limited environmental carrying capacity available to sustain a fish
stock.^ The other reason is that the demand is likely to shift outwards over time
due to the high income elasticity of demand, and due to the expected shift in tastes
toward fish because of alleged health benefits.
Consequently, without detailed knowledge of industry expectations about fu-
^ As a caveat, note that this supply constraint will be modified to the extent that supplies
from mariculture and aquaculture are developed.242 Lindner, Campbell, and Bevin
ture changes in fishery rent, it is impossible to draw any reliable inferences about
levels of resource rent in any given year from trading prices for perpetual quota.
Prices Paid for Annual Lease of Quota
A summary of trading prices for annual lease of quota for selected fish stocks is
reported in Table 3. As with the prices for perpetual quota report in Table 2, high,
low, median, and average prices are reported. A lower bound estimate of aggre-
gate willingness to pay for annual lease quota of NZ$59 million for the 1986/87
season, and of NZ$75 million for the 1987/88 season was obtained by multiplying
the median price by the corresponding TAC for each species for which data were
available.
As suggested in the second section above, in a deterministic and certain world
the price of quota in the annual lease market will measure current resource rent
provided that the market is competitive and in long-run steady state equilibrium,
and provided that quota trades are not conditional on trades of other assets such
as vessels, or otherwise distorted by tax or regulatory considerations.
However, the current annual lease markets in the New Zealand fishing indus-
try do not conform to the sort of ideal and stylized market described above. In the
first place, the industry is operating under a set of cost conditions which are not
conducive to a competitive equilibrium. Secondly, changes brought about by the
implementation of the QMS guarantee that the industry will be going through a
period of adjustment for a few years. Thirdly, price, cost and catching conditions
facing the industry are, and will continue to be stochastic even after industry has
adjusted to the QMS. Hence the market operates in a climate of highly imperfect
information. Finally, trade in quotas is likely to be distorted by tax or other
considerations.
For these reasons, annual lease prices for quota are unlikely to provide reliable
and accurate estimates of current fishery resource rents. The basic problem is that
the decision to lease quota on an annual basis is, and always will be dictated by
short-run rather than by long-run considerations. Hence willingness to pay for a
quota lease will be determined primarily by the margin between incremental rev-
enue and variable costs associated with utilization of the leased quota. This mar-
gin, by definition, exceeds resource rents.
As explained by Anderson (1988), the requirement of the act to balance catch
with quota at the end of each month creates what is undoubtedly the most extreme
example of a situation where willingness to pay for quota can exceed resource
rents. Vessels which exceed their quota for a species are required to purchase
additional quota to cover the excess catch before the proceeds from the sale of the
catch are released to them. When such a need to acquire quota arises, willingness
to pay for quota on a short-term basis can exceed resource rents by a sum which
includes all otherwise variable costs as well as all fixed and overhead costs in-
volved in catching fish. Indeed, because resource rentals themselves are payable
quarterly in advance, even these costs are fixed and cannot be saved during the
course of the year. Furthermore, once the fish have been caught, literally none of
the costs involved in catching them are variable any more. In other words, since
all costs are sunk it is rational for fishermen to be willing to pay any price for quota
up to the port price for delivering the fish.
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not made in such dire circumstances as those described above. For such cases,
costs of labour, fuel and other operating costs will most likely be variable, but
other costs such as administration, the opportunity cost of capital invested in
shipping and office space etc, depreciation of plant and equipment, plus any
contractual obligations of a long term nature which cannot be avoided simply by
electing not to put out to sea to try to catch fish, will be fixed. The firm's will-
ingness to pay for quota in the short-run will not take these fixed costs into
account with the result that willingness to pay for quota will exceed current
resource rents by a margin up to the level of costs that are already fixed at the time
when the quota is leased.
The degree of market concentration in much of the New Zealand fishing in-
dustry is not consistent with the assumption of a competitive market. The per-
centages of total quota held in 1986/87 by the six largest quota holders for three
major species were:
Hoki—76 per cent; Orange Roughy—75 per cent; squid—59 per cent (New
Zealand Fishing Industry Board, 1989). Presumably this degree of concentration
refiects economies of size in catching these deep-water species. As a result, the
marginal willingness to pay for quota (approximated by port price less the mar-
ginal cost of catching) will exceed resource rent (approximated by port price less
long-run average catching costs).
The concentration in ownership of quota refiects similar concentration in the
processing sector, again as a result of the existence of scale economies. Because
the ability to catch fish can generate extra returns in other sectors of the industry,
such as processing and/or marketing, vertically integrated firms may be willing to
acquire extra quota because they have excess capacity in their processing and/or
marketing arms which can generate positive gross margins if extra fish are caught.
Gross margins from these post harvest operations also can get incorporated into
the willingness to pay for annual lease of quota.
For the above reasons, catch quotas are highly complementary to other inputs
in the industry such as vessels and processing capacity. Sales of vessels together
with quota are reasonably common, particularly in a market in which there is
excess catching capacity, and where the possession of quota is the critical limiting
factor. In these circumstances the important consideration to the trading parties is
the overall price of the transaction—the price of vessel and the quota, so the
recorded price of quota is a notional price which may bear no relationship to
resource rent, or to willingness to pay for quota per se.
In addition to the above considerations, Anderson (1988) has carefully ex-
plained how what he calls 'high-liner rents' and what otherwise can be regarded
as under payment of fishing skills, are also likely to be incorporated into the price
paid for annual lease of ITQ's.
The extent to which it might be necessary to discount trading prices for annual
lease of quota to adjust for fixed costs built into lease prices can be very large.
Without detailed information about the structure of fishing industry costs, it is not
possible to identify precisely the magnitude of fixed costs under various circum-
stances. Data on the costs of deep-water trawling for four representative vessels
are provided in New Zealand Fishing Industry Board (1988, Table 6.5). For these
vessels, the average cost of crew, fuel and repairs was equal to 48 per cent of
catch value, which can be treated as a proxy for total cost. On the same basis, all
non-capital costs averaged 77 per cent of total costs. Aggregate data on costs of246 Lindner, Campbell, and Bevin
catching fish also are available from surveys conducted by the Board, and these
data are summarized in Table 4. Even in the very long-run, it could be judged that
at least 19 per cent of these fishing costs are sunk. For short term decisions of less
than one year's duration, all costs except fuel, fish, providoring, repairs and
others could be fixed. Such costs account for about 60 per cent of total costs.
Similar conclusions could be deduced from the data in Table 1.
To illustrate how excluding those sunk costs likely to be built into annual lease
quota prices can affect measures of current resource rents, sunk cost and other
appropriate deductions can be assumed to be a percentage of the price received
for fish. To cover all likely circumstances, the percentage of port price treated as
an estimate of fixed costs was varied from 10% to 50%. This amount was deducted
from the median price paid for annual lease of quota for each species, and then
multiplied by the TAC and summed over species to obtain an estimate of aggre-
gate resource rent. Based on the above data, annual quota lease prices could
exceed resource rents by a margin equal to 20 to 30 per cent of port price, which
corresponds to estimates of resource rents ranging from -NZ$17.5 million to
- NZ$65 million. If 50 per cent of total catching costs are built into annual lease
prices, then actual resource rents could be as low as -NZ$159 million. On the
other hand, they would equal nearly NZ$30 million if only 10 per cent of total
costs are sunk into quota lease prices.
Now consider a world in which prices, costs and catching conditions are
subject to changes which can be treated as occurring at random from the point of
view of the industry. In this stochastic world, quota holders can be assumed to
have expectations about the likely values of economic and environmental vari-
ables, and hence about the value of quota. Detailed analysis of the functioning of
Table 4
Aggregate Accounts for the Catching Activities of
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a market operating under imperfect knowledge can be very complex, and is be-
yond the scope of this paper. However, a simple search model would predict that
individual willingness to pay for quota will take on more extreme values, the lower
are the opportunity costs of not making a trade, and the lower is the quality of
information about the market clearing price of quota. As the fishing season pro-
gresses, more and better information about the value of annual lease quota be-
comes available. If the information is favourable (e.g. better than expected price)
asking price for quota will be raised. Likewise, depending on whether catch is
worse or better than expected, the opportunity cost of holding quota may rise or
fall over the season. If it is worse, the quota holder may find that there is no
market for the quota late in the season because the TAC cannot be taken; but if
it is better, he may find strong demand for quota by vessels which need extra
quota at the end of the season to cover higher than expected catches.
When quota leasing decisions have to be made in an uncertain environment,
annual willingness to pay for quota will exceed annual resource rent because the
act of holding the quota per se does not create any obligation to attempt to catch
fish irrespective of the short-run profitability from doing so.^ Holding quota is
analogous to holding an option in the financial market to purchase shares at some
future date. It is generally accepted that capital markets are efficient in processing
available information, so the expected value of future price movements will be
zero. Notwithstanding these expectations, it is well documented that a positive
price is paid in the market for such options to purchase shares, and it is rational
to do so because there is no obligation to take up the option if future price
movements prove to be unfavourable.
Likewise, given that holding quota only provides the option to fish, annual
willingness to pay for quota can be predicted to exceed expected resource rents by
a margin which is equivalent to an option premium in the share market. "* The size
of such an option premium will be equal to the expected value of the avoided
losses by not fishing if and when future returns do not cover variable costs. In the
short-run," holding quota surplus to expected level of catch provides the option
to continue fishing should realised catch rates be higher than expected. The ex-
pected value of such an option will depend, inter alia, on the likelihood of needing
extra quota for this purpose, as well as on the potential returns that would be
realized if the quota can be used. Without further research it is difficult to gauge
the possible size of such an option premium.
Summary
It has been argued in this paper that one might reasonably expect there to be initial
losses associated with the introduction of an ITQ system. In the New Zealand
fisheries three sources of data are available to the fishery manager who wishes to
•* This "distortion" between wilUngness-to-pay for quota and management rent also ap-
plied to trades in Ihe market for perpetual quota.
"* Similar but analytically distinct arguments have been made by Anderson (1987) with
respect to an option premium component in prices for import quotas, and by Karpoff (1988)
with respect to an option premium in the price of limited entry fishery licenses.
'' In the long-run, if unfavourable scenarios such as a collapse in fish prices and/or stocks
materialise and force quota holders to mothball some or al! of their quota, it may be
possible to avoid certain semi-fixed cost as well as variable catching costs.248 Lindner, Campbell, and Bevin
monitor the current peiformance of the system, or to collect resource rentals.
These sources are: annual profitability data; the market price of perpetual quota;
and the market price of annual lease quota. It was suggested that some of the
information provided by these sources is irrelevant, misleading, or contradictory.
The relevant data have to be identified, interpreted correctly, and the contradic-
tions resolved If the information is to provide an accurate picture of performance.
In particular, a better understanding of the market in annual lease quota is re-
quired. A detailed analysis of quota markets to estimate the extent to which
annual lease prices are inflated by short-run considerations is suggested as a
worthwhile topic for further research.
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